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The Use of Digital Millenium
Copyright Act to Stifle Speech Through
Non-Copyright Related Takedowns
Miller Freeman*

In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. This law provided new methods of protecting copyright in
online media.2 These protections shift the normal judicial process
that would stop the publication of infringing materials to private
actors: the online platforms.3 As a result, online platforms receive
notices of infringement and issue takedowns of allegedly
copyrighted works without the judicial process which normally
considers the purpose of the original notice of infringement. In at
least one case, discussed in detail below, this has resulted in a notice
and takedown against an individual for reasons not related to the
purpose of copyright, and not related to the copyrighted product
either. This paper will discuss whether it is appropriate to use
copyright law to stifle speech unrelated to the copyrighted product
in order to protect the reputation of the copyright owner. This paper
will then provide potential solutions to the apparent need of
copyright owners to provide reputational protections for their works
as well as the Constitutional rights of those targeted by some
copyright owners.
1

*Miller Freeman is President of Common Sense Washington, a nonprofit seeking
simple, common sense solutions for issues facing Washingtonians. Mr. Freeman
has a Juris Doctor from the University of San Diego School of Law and an LL.M.
in Innovation and Technology Law from Seattle University School of Law.
1

See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998).
2
17 U.S.C. §512(c) (1998).
3
See id.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are someone who enjoys playing video games.
Similar to at least 30,000 others, you want to share your enjoyment
online4 via a streaming service such as Twitch or through Let’s Play5
videos on a platform like YouTube.6 If you become popular enough,
you may earn a piece of the advertising pie of whichever service you
are using, which could include a portion of potential subscription
fees or “tips.”7 If you are really good at what you do and really
lucky, you may be one of the rare streamers who makes a living by
producing and posting (or streaming) videos on these platforms.8
Now imagine that part of your popularity stems from
commentary, such as how the game reflects or challenges society
and its values, that you add while playing the games you stream.9
4

Gamers generally share videos of themselves gaming in one of two manners.
They record a game session, including voiceovers from themselves either
recorded during the game session or added after the session ended. They may then
add additional sound effects or visual art from other sources to the video.
Secondly, they stream the game session live, usually with a live mic so that
viewers may both watch the game session and hear what the gamer is saying to
teammates or to his audience. Importantly to this paper, these videos show a full
screen video or streaming video of the game itself as the gamer would see it on
his monitor. Many times gamers also insert a small video of themselves as they
play into the corner of the screen, but most often all that is seen is the game by
itself.
5
Let’s Play videos are used as the exemplar throughout this paper for brevity.
This category does and should include the many different platforms upon which
gamers record and post their videos or stream them live. Such platforms include
YouTube, Twitch, Facebook, Mixer, and more. Mark Longhurst, Six Alternative
Streaming Platforms to Twitch, MEDIUM (Dec. 21, 2017), https://medium.com/
the-emergence/six-alternative-streaming-platforms-to-twitch-ebf6ae7113e3
[https://perma.cc/T22Z-WMAU].
6
30,000 is an approximation based upon the reported concurrent viewership at
both Twitch and YouTube as reported in TechCrunch. Sarah Perez, YouTube
Gaming Grew its Streamer Base by 343% in 2017, Twitch by 197%,
TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/25/youtubegaming-grew-its-streamer-base-by-343-in-2017-twitch-by-197/
[https://perma.cc/PS92-DYHL].
7
See id. Streamers make their money via a small percentage of advertising
revenues (such as YouTube’s AdSense program) or by accepting subscription
money or tips from viewers of their streams.
8
Esports legend “Ninja” makes over $500,000 per month streaming on Twitch
and YouTube. He has over 3.7 million Twitch followers and more than 5 million
subscribers to his YouTube channel. Darren Heitner, Esports Legend Ninja
Confirms He Is Earning Over $500,000 Per Month, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2018/03/20/esports-legend-ninjaconfirms-he-is-earning-over-500000-per-month/#377aa3fa6652
[https://perma.cc/F6UT-GU4W].
9
This hypothetical is used purely to highlight the core issues at play. This
hypothetical is based upon non-partisan political speech but could easily be
focused on support for a particular political party or ideology.
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Some viewers may find your perspectives to be inconsistent with
their world views or political beliefs and they may begin loudly
calling for you to be blocked from the platform. For you, this may
mean being cut off from your livelihood.
These people may become so loud that the companies
whose games you are playing in your videos start feeling the
pressure to respond in order to show that they are not like you and
don’t subscribe to your beliefs. The companies may turn to their
most extreme and powerful option to stop your use of their game the issuance a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
takedown notice (also called a DMCA “strike”) for all of your
videos that include their games. As a result, you are left with a
shrinking (or nonexistent, depending on how many companies issue
similar DMCA strikes) set of content from which you may support
yourself and your family.
A similar situation happened in the Fall of 2017 to Felix
Kjellberg, an extremely popular streamer on YouTube. Felix, who
goes by the screen name “Pewdiepie,” is not the most sympathetic
person. The utterances for which this millionaire lost sponsorships
from Disney and YouTube are generally viewed as vile.10 However,
the issuance of a DMCA takedown by Campo Santo, the game’s
publisher, against Pewdiepie for his viewpoints11 raises a novel legal
question: Should copyright law be used for the purpose of punishing
another for their viewpoints or preventing reputational harm caused
by the association of the publishes games used in the gamer’s
videos? Does the use of copyright law in this manner align with that
law’s purpose?
This paper will briefly examine the issues of licenses for
video games and particularly for creation of Let’s Play videos and
streams. It will then discuss the purpose and origin of the DMCA
followed by the widening use of copyright law by individuals and
companies seeking to limit what others say about them and the
potential reputational harms of being associated with the purported
copyright infringers such as Pewdiepie. This paper will then
10

Pewdiepie first lost his sponsorships from Disney and YouTube for creating a
video where he paid two Indian actors (who spoke little English) to hold up a sign
stating “Death to all Jews,” but the spur for the DMCA takedown was half a year
later when he used a racial epithet during a livestream. Shaun Prescott, PewDiePie
Uses Racial Slur During Stream, Prompting Developer Action, PC GAMER (Sept.
11, 2017), https://www.pcgamer.com/pewdiepie-uses-racial-slur-during-streamprompting-developer-action/ [https://perma.cc/FZ44-49CK]; Andy
Chalk, Pewdiepie Responds to ‘Attack’ Over Anti-Semitic Video, Invites Media to
‘Try Again’, PC GAMER (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.pcgamer.com/pewdiepieresponds-to-attack-over-anti-semitic-video-invites-media-to-try-again/
[https://perma.cc/C5EB-P5G3].
11
Id. (noting that the DMCA takedown was issued largely because co-founder of
Campo Santo was “sick of this child [Pewdiepie] getting more and more chances
to make money off of what we make.”).
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examine the legalities surrounding the Let’s Play videos use of
copyrighted materials; specifically, it will examine the potential
First Amendment issues and how courts treat intellectual property
cases where the purpose of the lawsuit does not fit the traditional
intellectual property regime. Finally, this paper will explore whether
Fair Use12 protects these videos. Following this will be a discussion
of what changes, if any, may be needed in copyright law, and
whether publishers can address their concerns through new licensing
terms.
II.

VIDEO GAME LICENSES AND LET’S PLAY VIDEOS

Video games generally operate under software licenses. This
means that the gamer does not outright own the game; rather, the
gamer has purchased a right to use the game only to the extent that
the terms and conditions of the game’s licensees permits.13 Under
these licenses, game companies reserve all rights, including in the
specific content of the various images, sounds, characters, and in at
least one case, assigns anything that the gamer creates using the
game to the game company.14 Further, many licenses require that
the gamer assign irrevocable licenses to the game company of
anything that the gamer creates using that game.15 These End User
License Agreements (EULA’s) are the first hurdle for any gamer
attempting to post videos online of their gameplay.
However, there appears to be general implied licenses for
Let’s Play videos and streams. These implied licenses are actually
acknowledged by at least one game company, Campo Santo – the
one of which Pewdiepie ran afoul.16 Several websites focus on these
12

The fair use statute provides guidelines for what portions and how much of a
copyrighted work may be used by a non-rights holder. Infra note 65. Generally,
fair use is considered to include parodies of copyrighted works, criticisms, and
more. See CAMPBELL, infra note 77.
13
Samples of various End User License Agreements (EULA) can be seen at
Blizzard Legal, BLIZZARD.COM (2020), http://us.blizzard.com/enus/company/legal/eula [https://perma.cc/Q35J-EFTE] (hereinafter samples of
EULAs); End User Access and License Agreement, STAR WARS THE OLD
REPUBLIC, http://www.swtor.com/legalnotices/euala [https://perma.cc/8ABS5H9D]; Bethesda Softworks EULA, THE SIMPLE EULA PROJECT, http://simple
eulas.weebly.com/bethesda-eula.html [https://perma.cc/L649-MGSQ].
14
See samples of EULAs, supra note 13.
15
See STAR WARS THE OLD REPUBLIC, supra note 13. The Electronic Arts license
very specifically requires that where the gamer “own[s] certain copyrights over
any Content created by [the gamer] by using the [game], [the gamer] assign[s] to
EA and/or its licensors all and any intellectual and industrial property rights in all
and any such Content.” The EULA goes on to require a non-revocable license in
case the rights are not assignable.
16
Firewatch - Tell me about Firewatch!, CAMPO SANTO (2020),
http://www.firewatchgame.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/342Y-PQQY]
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videos and streams from gamers, permitting monetization of the
videos in many cases. The game companies themselves gain great
benefits in free publicity with more eyes seeing their products and
then buying them. Campo Santo’s co-founder said as much when he
acknowledged how much money they had made off of the videos
for which they issued the DMCA takedown.17 The rarity of such
takedowns further offers some support of an implied license.18
If a court holds that these implied licenses actually exist, the
game companies would likely react by including terms limiting the
use of Let’s Play videos and streams in their licenses going forward.
Some companies have already taken this step, and a model for such
licenses can be seen on Blizzard’s website, which requires among
other things that the gamer maintain a “T” rating under the ESRB.19
Assuming that they follow Blizzard’s example, and that the Campo
Santo EULA page performs this same purpose, the question then
becomes whether the gamer in creating their videos exceeds the
conditions of the license. When a licensor creates a license that “is
limited in scope and the licensee acts outside the scope, the licensor
can bring an action for copyright infringement.”20 In Pewdiepie’s
case, Campo Santo set a condition in its EULA that the gamers could
not “spread hate or harassment.”21 By violating these licenses,
gamers are subject to copyright law.
Accordingly, gamers such as Pewdiepie may be subjected to
certain undefined community standards in these licenses and either
exceed the license grant or the game company may revoke that
license. At that point, gamers are subject to the copyright laws and
especially to the DMCA’s notice and takedown provisions. This
leads to an examination of whether punishment of viewpoints or
purported reputational harms by association are cognizable under
copyright law.
(hereinafter Firewatch) (“Can I stream this game? Can I make money off of those
streams? Yes. We love that people stream and share their experiences in the game,
and we extend the priviledge [sic] of streaming and monetizing our games on
Twitch, YouTube, Steam, and elsewhere to our customers. Streaming and Let's
Plays are implicit but revokable [sic] privileges, and if you happen to be among
the very, very, very, very few players who use your platform to spread hate or
harassment, we would prefer that you not use our games in your content.”)
17
Sean Vanaman, co-founder of Campo Santo, stated “I’m sure we’ve made
money off of the 5.7M views [Pewdiepie’s Firewatch Let’s Play] video has…”
Prescott, supra note 10.
18
Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
an implied license may be implied from conduct).
19
Infra note 113. Blizzard dedicates a full webpage to the standards allowed for
Let’s Play videos and streams. The requirement of a “T” rating by the ESRB is
minimally defined.
20
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989) and DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, § 1015[A] (Matthew Bender Elite Products 1999)).
21
CAMPO SANTO, supra note 16.
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COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE DMCA

Courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of copyright
law, like all intellectual property law, is an economic one. Namely,
this purpose is to provide a limited monopoly on the author’s work
so that he or she may profit from it. The economic incentive to
create copyrightable works acts in furtherance of the public good to
fulfill the Constitutional mandate to “promote the progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”22 This Clause forms the basis of the understood
purpose of intellectual property law. As the Supreme Court held in
Harper & Row Publrs. v. Nation Enters., “the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing
a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”23 The
Court, citing two other Supreme Court cases, particularly noted that
the “immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.”24 As a result, authors are able to
create works without fear that others will use them or put them out
as their own, potentially leaving authors with all the effort and
expense of creating a work and none of the credit or financial
reward.
The DMCA modified the Copyright Act of 1976 to prepare
for the digital age by adding a safe harbor and notice, takedown, and
put-back procedures.25 The DMCA did no more than add new tools
to the copyright law. As the Second Circuit noted in Authors Guild
v. Google, Inc., the purpose of copyright did not change following
enactment of the DMCA.26 That court noted that “the ultimate,
primary intended beneficiary is the public.”27
At first blush, the DMCA appears wonderfully balanced to
handle the digital age. The DMCA provides for a safe harbor for
online service providers who do not create the potentially infringing
products but merely host them on their websites.28 It created an
22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (citing
prior cases).
24
Id. (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
25
See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
26
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2nd Cir. 2015) (“The ultimate
goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and understanding, which
copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators exclusive control over
copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive to create… works
for public consumption.”).
27
Id.
28
See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
23
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extrajudicial process whereby a copyright owner may send a
takedown notice to the service provider, identifying what that owner
believes to be an infringement of their copyright.29 The provider
then takes the content down and notifies the person who uploaded
the potentially infringing content and informs them what is required
to replace that content online. If the putative infringer fails to
respond to this notice, the content is not replaced. However, that
putative infringer may instead file a put-back notice, at which point
the copyright owner may then, and only then, file a lawsuit against
that person.30
Unfortunately, most service providers consider the put-back
notice process impractical and find that gamers rarely utilize the putback notice tool. Further, this process emphasizes the removal of
potentially infringing material before a put-back notice may be
made, thus removing material provided by a putative infringer
before any determination of infringement or argument of fair use or
noninfringement may be made. This perceived weak protection in
the DMCA for targets of rights owners is compounded by the fact
that “the typical target of a DMCA complaint has ‘little or no
knowledge of copyright law,’” and would not know how to calculate
the legal risks involved in issuing a put-back notice.31 The power
imbalance between the typical person who posts on the internet and
the media companies’ armies of attorneys also does not support a
robust put-back system.32 Instead, takedown notices issued by some
providers tend to heavily emphasize the risk of lawsuits should an
alleged infringer respond with a put-back notice. The result is
intimidation, whether intended or not, and the minimal use of the
put-back safety mechanism in the DMCA.33 Additionally, many
rights owners and service providers are separately automating the
takedown process. Rights owners are using algorithms to search for
potentially infringing content and using those algorithms to
compose and issue the takedown notices. The larger service
providers such as YouTube are also automating the same process,
automatically removing content based upon an algorithm’s analysis
of the takedown notice.34 With a lopsided extrajudicial process in
29

Id. The notice must contain very specific pieces of information in order to be
valid under the DMCA, but the specifics are not at issue in this paper. This paper
assumes that all notices follow the required form except where noted specifically.
30
Id.
31
JENNIFER M. URBAN, JOE KARAGANIS & BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, NOTICE AND
TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE, AMERICAN ASSEMBLY AND BERKELEY LAW
44-45 (2017).
32
Id. at 45.
33
Id. at 46. One rights holder noted having issued over 9,000 takedowns in a twoyear period and receiving only 7 put-back notices – but two were administrative
errors and the remainder were from locations outside the USA which the rights
owner could not reach in a lawsuit.
34
Id. at 45.
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the takedown and put-back notices, the expansion of the use of the
DMCA to cover harms not related to the purpose of copyright law
is concerning.
IV.

USE OF COPYRIGHT LAW TO PROTECT AGAINST
REPUTATIONAL DAMAGE

With a scarcity of legal avenues for those suffering
reputational harms, many have turned to copyright law to fill in the
gaps.35 Plaintiffs have increasingly used copyright in this manner to
capitalize on copyright’s powerful litigation tools and target these
tools at those purportedly harming the plaintiffs’ reputations.
Copyright law, and the DMCA in particular, permit outright
censorship of the harmful product to a prevailing plaintiff. Using the
DMCA, as in the case with Pewdiepie, the harmful work may be
permanently removed from the internet. Under copyright law, a
permanent injunction against use of and even destruction of the
harmful work may be ordered by a court.36 Unlike a successful
privacy tort which would result only after a drawn out court battle
and require the plaintiff to perform individual takedown notices, a
DMCA takedown removes the offending work completely without
the need to visit a courtroom.
These attempted expansions of copyright law to cover
reputational harm vary in substance from attempting to stop sex
tapes (both those made by celebrities and revenge porn37) from
getting published, to removal of bad photos of an owner of a
professional sports team, to removal of the anti-Muslim video
purportedly the spur for the Benghazi attack, and more.38 The
courts’ treatments of these copyright claims have also varied, from
deep discussion of how the claims do not align with the purpose of
copyright, to cases where the courts apparently ignored those
purposes.39
In Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against Gawker Media for
publishing his sex tape, Hogan brought a copyright claim that the
35

See Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Keynote Address: Censorship in the Guise
of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2016); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why
Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549 (2015).
36
17 U.S.C. § 502-503.
37
“Revenge porn” is used here to refer to a category of material, usually sexually
graphic images of former intimate partners distributed online without that
partner’s consent. See YANET RUVALCABA & ASIA A. EATON, NONCONSENSUAL
PORNOGRAPHY AMONG U.S. ADULTS: A SEXUAL SCRIPTS FRAMEWORK ON
VICTIMIZATION, PERPETRATION, AND HEALTH CORRELATES FOR WOMEN AND
MEN, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (2019), https://www.cybercivil
rights.org/2019-publication/ [https://perma.cc/968H-3PTR].
38
McKeown, supra note 35, at 10-11. Fromer, supra note 35, at 557-63.
39
Id. at 576.
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court quickly dismissed.40 The court held that Hogan could not use
copyright to protect his professional image as this claim was not the
sort of irreparable harm contemplated in copyright.41 Unlike
Hogan’s sex tape, a court found a valid copyright claim in the
Pamela Anderson and Bret Michaels sex tape.42 There, the court
determined that a preliminary injunction was appropriate by holding
that defendant’s use of the tape interfered with Anderson’s and
Michaels’ ability to sell the tape in the market.43 By treating the
plaintiffs as market participants, the copyright claim then aligned
with the purpose of copyright law.
Courts are reluctant to apply copyright to reputational claims
where damages are unrelated to the work’s value and marketability.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a plaintiff attempted
outright censorship in his case against a blogger who used an
unflattering photo of the plaintiff as part of a critical blog post. The
blogger had focused his critical attention on the co-owner of the
Miami Heat; the use of the photo only the latest shot at him. The
court held that the blogger’s use of the photo constituted fair use, in
part because the plaintiff’s “attempt to utilize copyright as an
instrument of censorship against unwanted criticism” had destroyed
the market for the work.44 The Ninth Circuit also addressed an
asserted reputational harm in Garcia v. Google, Inc., where an
actress with a bit part in the video “Innocence of Muslims” asserted
a copyright claim to remove the video under the DMCA.45 That
video was allegedly the catalyst for the Benghazi attacks that killed
several Americans.46 The Ninth Circuit noted that “authors cannot
seek emotional distress damages under the Copyright Act, because
such damages are unrelated to the value and marketability of their
works.”47 The court also explained how thin Garcia’s copyright
claim was, based upon a short scene in a larger work.48
While copyright law is increasingly used to protect against
non-copyright harms, courts’ analyses of plaintiffs’ purposes vary.
Some courts, like the one in the Pamela Anderson sex tape case,
assume that the plaintiff is acting as a market participant and
therefore find that the purpose of the suit coincides with a cognizable

40

Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
Id.
42
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828-29 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
43
Id. at 830-36.
44
McKeown, supra note 35, at 10-11.
45
See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F. 3d 733 (2015).
46
Id. at 738.
47
Id. at 745.
48
Id. at 741 (discussing how plaintiff’s work was part of a unitary whole for which
she disclaimed joint authorship).
41
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copyright harm.49 Other courts account for the purpose behind the
suit and factor it into its analysis, as the Eleventh Circuit did with
the photo of the co-owner of the Miami Heat, finding no market to
be harmed.50 Still other courts, as with Hulk Hogan’s copyright
claim against Gawker51 or Garcia’s claim against Google,52 find that
the purpose of the plaintiff does not match that of copyright law and
as a result determine there can be no damages.53
This scattered approach by the courts only adds to the
confusion surrounding the attempted expansion of copyright law to
cover other harms. Importantly, as the Ninth Circuit noted in its en
banc opinion in Garcia, the conflict between copyright law and the
First Amendment is only further highlighted by this attempted
expanded use of copyright law.54
V.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NON-MARKET HARMS

As Judge McKeown of the Ninth Circuit noted in both her
address at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review and her
decision in Garcia, significant tension exists between the First
Amendment and copyright law.55 The Supreme Court has declared
that “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment
accommodations.”56 The Court “identified the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense as ‘built-in’ First Amendment
protections.”57 However, these cases were in response to
Congressional acts to extend copyright protections in duration and
to works already in the public domain.58 These cases did not find
any extension of the purpose of copyright law.59
Judge McKeown and the Ninth Circuit are not the only ones
to notice this growing First Amendment conflict. Several online
articles and forums discussing the DMCA action against Pewdiepie
49

Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828-29 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
50
See McKeown, supra note 35.
51
Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
52
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015).
53
Id; Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla.
2012).
54
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (“a weak copyright
claim cannot justify censorship in the guise of authorship”).
55
Id; McKeown, supra note 35, at 2.
56
McKeown, supra note 35, at 3 (citing to Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003)) (a case fighting the dramatic extension of the copyright term by
Congress).
57
Id. (citing Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 181 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2012) (focused
on the extension of copyright protections to works previously in the public
domain).
58
See id.
59
See id.
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raised these same concerns.60 Unfortunately, while a proper DMCA
takedown notice requires the copyright holder to state under penalty
of perjury that they have a good faith belief that the potentially
infringing material is unauthorized, the DMCA does not require
information about the purpose behind the takedown request.61
However, the interaction between copyright law and the
First Amendment makes the purpose for DMCA takedowns
incredibly important. As Judge Lumbard stated in his concurrence
in Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc.,
the spirit of the First Amendment applies to the
copyright laws at least to the extent that the courts
should not tolerate any attempted interference with
the public’s right to be informed… when anyone
seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed
to protect interests of quite a different nature.62
Unlike the examples of sex tapes and revenge porn discussed above,
Let’s Play videos and streams more directly implicate the First
Amendment due to the actual speech content added by gamers such
as Pewdiepie. Both Pewdiepie and the exemplar which began this
paper address protectible speech, speech that is ultimately the
motivation for removing the videos. As the Ninth Circuit in Garcia
noted, that claim was “grounded in copyright law, not privacy,
emotional distress, or tort law, and [sought] to impose speech
restrictions under copyright laws meant to foster rather than repress
free expression.”63
60

See Mona Ibrahim, Firewatch Creators can Target PewDiePie with DMCA
Takedowns, and it’s Perfectly Legal, POLYGON (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.polygon.com/2017/9/12/16295412/pewdiepie-campo-santofirewatch-dmca-legal-abuse [https://perma.cc/7XGN-PLSG] (discussing possible
anti-SLAPP claims as well as a robust discussion showing the same First
Amendment concerns in the comments section following the article); see also
Andy Chalk, Pewdiepie Warns Against DMCA Abuse After YouTube Accepts
Copyright Claim Against Him, PC GAMER (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.pcgamer.com/pewdiepie-warns-against-dmca-abuse-after-youtubeaccepts-copyright-claim-against-him [https://perma.cc/NT4L-ARBS] (stating
that “the DMCA is not (or at least should not be) mean[t] to be used to force
content offline simply because copyright holder don’t like it”); Cecilia
D’Anastasio, Let’s Play Copyright Threat Raises Questions About the Law and
How to Use It, KOTAKU (Sept. 12, 2017), https://kotaku.com/lets-play-copyrightthreat-raises-questions-about-the-l-1803784376
[https://perma.cc/WN7G-DE64].
61
See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
62
Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2nd Cir. 1966)
(Lumbard, J., concurring) (finding no copyright infringement where a biographer
used copyrighted articles which copyrights were later purchased by a Howard
Hughes shell company in order to prevent publication of the biography).
63
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Further, these speech restrictions go against the purpose of
copyright law, namely to provide information for the public
benefit.64 Arguably, the use of copyright law to remove Let’s Play
videos and block streams violates the public policy that underpins
copyright law as these actions do nothing to save a protectible
copyright interest and instead remove information about these
games from the public. But until a court addresses these First
Amendment issues head on, the only protection for Let’s Play
videos and streams falls to the fair use statute.65
VI.

FAIR USE OF VIDEO GAME CONTENT IN
LET’S PLAY VIDEOS

The copyright fair use statute, called both an affirmative
defense and non-infringement by various courts, lays out a four
factor analysis to determine whether potentially infringing conduct
is protectible as fair use.66 The Ninth Circuit in Lenz v. Universal
Music Corp. held that a copyright holder must consider fair use prior
to issuing a DMCA takedown notice.67 As a result, game companies
like Campo Santo must consider whether Let’s Play videos
constitute fair use prior to issuing a DMCA takedown.
In Lenz v. Universal, a YouTube video of a baby dancing to
the sound of Prince playing in the background garnered the attention
of Universal, then owner of the copyright to the Prince song.68
Universal sent a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube, who removed
the video. The mother of the baby, who posted the video, along with
the Electronic Freedom Foundation, sued Universal for damages
under section 512(f) of the DMCA for improper takedown notice on
the theory that Universal should have considered fair use prior to
issuing the notice. The Ninth Circuit agreed that fair use must be
considered before a rights holder issues a takedown notice.
The impact from this case leads to a question of fair use in
videogame streaming and Let’s Play videos. Many gamers and
observers of this section of the videogame industry believe that
streaming a game live or posting videos constitutes fair use of the
copyrighted material.69 However, as discussed above, the put-back
64

Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307 (courts in passing upon particular claims of
infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a
maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the development of art,
science and industry.”) (citations omitted).
65
17 U.S.C. § 107.
66
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 107).
67
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2015).
68
Id. at 1149.
69
See Ibrahim, supra note 60; See Chalk, supra note 60; See D’Anastasio, supra
note 60.
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provision of the DMCA fails to help these streamers for multiple
reasons. First, the vast majority of people against whom a takedown
notice is made do not understand their rights and fail to avail
themselves of the put-back procedure. Second, many service
providers strongly suggest that use of the put back notice puts the
poster of the material at serious risk of lawsuits from the rights
holders. And third, the service providers themselves rarely provide
easy access to a put-back system.70
Most importantly, Urban’s survey of service providers
indicated that they felt the put-back provisions of the DMCA fail
due to the fact that major rights holders have legions of lawyers to
throw at each potential infringer.71 This disproportionate legal
power, in addition to the independent nature and lack of legal
sophistication of the streamers, leads to a situation where streamers
do not have the tools intended by the DMCA to fight against
improper takedowns.
Under Lenz, a rights holder only needs a subjective good
faith belief that the accused infringer has no fair use defense for their
videos.72 Unfortunately, streamers fall into a fair use gray area that
has never been tested in court. Gamers routinely use a majority of
the copyrighted materials in their streams or videos, where they, in
either one video or many, play through a majority of a publisher’s
game. While many commenters support a fair use defense for Let’s
Play videos and streamers73 the videogame industry has stated a
strong argument that fair use does not exist in streams.74 Some
developers in the industry instead include permissions within their
terms of use for streamers, which the developers may seemingly
revoke at any time, as they did with Pewdiepie.75
Section 107 lays out the fair use factors which, under Lenz,
a copyright owner must analyze prior to issuing a DMCA takedown.
Those factors are
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

70

See URBAN, KARAGANIS & SCHOFIELD, supra note 31, at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
72
Lenz, 815 F.3d 1145, 1163.
73
See Craig Drachtman, Do “Let’s Play” Videos Constitute Fair Use?,
IPLSRUTGERS (Jan. 26, 2014), https://iplsrutgers.wordpress.com/2014/01/26/dolets-play-videos-constitute-fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/T677-ZVFU].
74
See D’Anastasio, supra note 60.
75
See samples of EULAs, supra note 13; Firewatch, supra note 16.
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.76
An analysis of these four factors in Let’s Play videos and streams
follows.
A. Factor One:
The “transformative” nature of the allegedly infringing work
helps determine for whom the first factor weighs in favor.77 Courts
have explained that this transformation is not that of changing
forms, as in translating a book into a new language or creating a film
from the book, rather this transformation must “communicate
something new and different from the original or expand its
utility.”78 As the court in Authors Guild noted, the statute provides
examples of changes of form, such as the book translation, which
are not permissible under the first fair use factor. Rather, a
transformation under both Campbell and Authors Guild is one which
criticizes or provides information about the copyrighted work.79
Further, courts have repeatedly held that the commercial
nature question in the first factor covers whether the allegedly
infringing product acts as a market substitute for the protected work,
and that the alleged infringer’s commercial motive is largely
irrelevant.80 As a result, the fact that many Let’s Play gamers make
money off of their videos 81does not factor against a finding of fair
use. Instead, the focus of the first factor is properly on what
transformation these gamers make to the copyrighted works.
Let’s Play videos and streams transform the games they play
via the commentary they make during a game session included in
the videos. These videos at least include a gamer’s voice, recorded
or transmitted live, along with the sound and video of the game they
are playing. Additionally, many gamers add their own or other art
to the videos to highlight something for the audience.82 A significant
76

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
78
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2nd Cir. 2015).
79
Id. at 215-16.
80
Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2nd Cir. 1966)
(citations omitted); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (noting that had Congress
intended the purely commercial nature of an allegedly infringing work to factor
against a finding of fair use, “nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble” to section 107 would be infringement).
81
See supra note 7 & 8.
82
Tyler “Ninja” Blevins’ YouTube channel exhibits the many transformative
additions made by gamers in their videos and streams. Ninja includes a new
creative introduction for his videos, a picture-in-picture video of himself as he
plays the game and running commentary. See Ninja, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/user/NinjasHyper [https://perma.cc/AR6V-LUDL].
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percentage of gamers also include a picture in picture video of
themselves in one corner of the screen as they are playing the game
(the remainder of the screen is almost always taken up by a view of
the game as if the watcher were playing it).83
Like Google’s scanning of every page of every book from
multiple libraries in the Authors Guild case, Let’s Play videos and
streams add transformative value to the games in several ways while
using a significant portion of the copyrighted works. Google added
transformative value by creating a snippet view and search function
to help searchers better find the books they wanted to purchase. With
Let’s Play, gamers transform a purely interactive experience into a
passive one. Gamers also create these videos to show how to defeat
a particularly difficult part of the game, identify strengths and
weaknesses of characters or equipment available in the games, and
lampoon crazy in-game stunts or bugs.84
The issue in Let’s Play transformative use comes down to
whether “the value of the transformative purpose is overcome by its
providing [the work] in a manner that offers a competing
substitute.”85 What gamers create in Let’s Play videos does not
generally substitute in the market for the video games.86 In fact, most
gaming companies permit and actively encourage the creation of
Let’s Play videos as free advertising for their products.87 Further,
Let’s Play videos are at their very core a commentary on the games.
Exactly what section 107 calls out for permissible fair use.
However, a court will likely examine the extent of this
commentary. Such an analysis may find that the transformation is
minimal in the context of the overall allegedly infringing work.
Even so, the first fair use factor will favor, at least slightly, the Let’s
Play gamer.

83

An example of these types of videos can be found on Ninja’s YouTube channel.
Id. Ninja’s channel has over 22 million subscribers as of January 13, 2020. Id.
84
What is a Let’s Play on YouTube?, MEDIAKIX, http://mediakix.com/2016/02/
what-is-a-youtube-lets-play-video/#gs.SszNlNE [https://perma.cc/5J4X-SCXJ].
85
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202, 218.
86
Games that are basically interactive novels, such as THAT DRAGON, CANCER,
http://www.thatdragoncancer.com/ [https://perma.cc/G2LP-4NV6], where the
story is the primary focus of the game, do experience market substitution effects,
as once a viewer has seen the story, many do not feel the need to purchase the
game. Games such as these are in a separate category from those discussed in this
paper, and generally face market harms which are wholly in line with the purpose
of copyright law. For that reason, they are not discussed in this paper as the focus
of most DMCA claims there are not related to reputational harms, but copyright
harms. Ryan Green, On Let’s Plays, THAT DRAGON, CANCER (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.thatdragoncancer.com/thatdragoncancer/2016/3/24/on-lets-plays
[https://perma.cc/5LHJ-LQDZ].
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Prescott, supra note 10 (Campo Santo co-founder admits to having made money
off of Pewdiepie’s videos of Firewatch).
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B. Factor Two:
The nature of the copyrighted work examines how fanciful
versus factual the work is, with the result that the more fanciful the
work, the more protections that work gets.88 A purely factual work,
such as a telephone book, gets minimal copyright protection because
copyright is intended to protect creative expression, not facts.89
Courts have found this factor to be rarely determinative.90 When
courts have weighted this factor, they did so only in the context that
the “law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual
works than works of fiction or fantasy.”91 This factor favors the
video game publishers as games are fictional works.
C. Factor Three:
Factor three examines how much of the copyrighted work
the alleged infringer uses. To claim fair use, the alleged infringer
must only use as much of the copyrighted work as needed for their
purpose while avoiding use of the heart of the work.92 This factor
will interact with the fourth factor, market substitution, as more of
the original work is taken.93
However, courts have found that complete copying of a work
could be justified as fair use when that copying was necessary to
achieve a transformative purpose and the end result did not act as a
market substitute for the original work.94 In Authors Guild, Google
copied the entirety of the original copyrighted books, placing these
copies into their servers.95 These copies were then made available to
be searched by the public with limitations that prevented the
searchers from reading more than a few lines of the books at a
time.96 As a result, Google’s copying of the works in order to make
them searchable in a limited fashion did not act as a market
substitute despite taking the entirety of the works.97
With gamers, as in Authors Guild, the amount of the original
work used is generally significant, depending on the video or

88

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
Id.
90
Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose).
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Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 220 (2nd Cir. 2015).
92
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587 (noting that “this factor calls for thought not only
about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance,
too”).
93
Id.
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Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 221.
95
Id. at 207.
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Id.
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Id. at 221-22.
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stream.98 Video games may have between just a few hours and
hundreds of hours of content, depending on the type of game. Each
video or stream posted by the gamer generally takes less than an
hour. An aggregation of these may end up being a significant portion
of the game (especially where a streamer plays one game for weeks
or months in a row). However, the question boils down to whether
or not this potentially significant amount of content use is only
enough to fulfill the purpose of the allegedly infringing work, and
whether it takes the heart of the work. This is not an easy analysis.
Streamers generally post their videos and create their streams to
entertain others, to show others how to play a particular game in a
successful manner, and to critique those games.99 These videos may
also include the climactic moments of the games, potentially
showing the heart of the work.100
As a result, this factor would depend on a factual analysis of
the use of the original work on a case by case basis. In most cases, a
court will likely find that a gamer’s videos and streams do not create
a market substitute for the games or potential derivatives of the
games. Therefore, this factor will depend upon how transformative
the use of the entirety or just the heart of the original works is under
the first factor.
D. Factor Four:
This factor examines “the effect of the [copying] use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”101 This
factor “must take account not only of harm to the original but also
of harm to the market for derivative works.”102 Courts have
identified this factor as the most important of the four fair use
factors.103
The potential loss of sales from harm to the reputation of the
copyright holder would not act as a market substitute. Indeed, even
where full copying of copyrighted works which could be read in part
in the same medium in which they were originally or derivatively
published, such a loss of sales can be insufficient “to make the copy
98

See Drachtman. supra note 73 (discussion of the various types of games in the
context of the third factor of fair use).
99
Mona Ibrahim, Deconstructing Lets Play, Copyright, and the YouTube Content
ID System: A Legal Perspective, GAMASUTRA (Dec. 12, 2013),
https://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/MonaIbrahim/20131212/206912/Deconstruct
ing_Lets_Play_Copyright_and_the_YouTube_Content_ID_Claim_System_A_L
egal_Perspective.php [https://perma.cc/X342-VCRA].
100
See id.
101
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 223 (2nd Cir. 2015).
102
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (citing Harper
& Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
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Id; see also Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223.
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an effectively competing substitute that would tilt the weighty fourth
factor in favor of the rights holder in the original.”104
As a result, courts should examine whether Let’s Play videos
and streams act as market substitutes for the original works or their
derivatives. As noted above, generally videogame companies like
gamers to stream their copyrighted works. It acts as free advertising,
and as seen in Pewdiepie’s case with the Campo Santo game
Firewatch, such streams may boost sales for the original work
significantly.105 Further, the transformation of interactive games
into a viewer-only experience does not “amount[] to mere
duplication of the entirety of an original” game.106
Because a passive video cannot substitute for the interactive
nature of the games themselves, courts must then look to the market
for derivative works. The types of derivatives seen in the video game
industry generally involve ports of the game from one platform to
another, game sequels or prequels, movies, and books.107 The first
two examples may be analyzed in the same fashion as the
duplication of the original game argument above. There appears to
be sufficient transformation from an interactive medium to a passive
one in the Let’s Play videos to at least make that point arguable in a
court. The latter two examples are closer in line with the Let’s Play
videos as they too are passive activities (except perhaps in the case
of a Choose Your Own Adventure book). However, as books do not
include moving images or sounds as part of their medium, a court
will likely not compare Let’s Play videos with the market for books.
Therefore, a court would look more closely at the potential
market for videos and movies as derivative works of the games.
Additionally, the first factor, the transformative use made of the
original work, impacts this analysis. Due to this transformation, a
court would likely find that Let’s Play videos and streams exist in a
different market than those of a video derived from the game. Games
tell stories or create scenarios. Let’s Play videos and streams add
often humorous commentary on the games or just coinciding with
the games, and often additional content to highlight points the
gamers want to make about the games. This shifts the Let’s Play
uses into a commentary role, something rarely seen in actual
derivative works, and more akin to Mystery Science Theater 3000
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Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 224.
Prescott, supra note 10.
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
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The Tomb Raider series best exemplifies the variety of derivative works.
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shows.108 This close analog of the Let’s Play videos has not been
tested in a fair use context, but like Let’s Play videos, would not be
considered a derivative use of the original works.
This fourth fair use factor will depend upon the facts in each
case. However, examining cases like this paper’s exemplar or
Pewdiepie’s Let’s Play video of Firewatch, a court would be hard
pressed to find these videos act as market substitutes for the actual
games or any potential derivative works. As a result, this factor
likely favors a finding of fair use.
E. Fair Use Analysis under the Four Factors:
Whether a gamer may claim protection under fair use
depends largely upon how much of the game they use, and
especially upon how transformative their use is. The first factor is
usually the most telling. Whether a court determines that the Let’s
Play video or stream was transformative enough will depend largely
upon the facts of each case, with a larger body of commentary within
the video aiding in a finding of likely fair use. The second factor,
while weighing in favor of the game companies, likely will not
affect a fair use determination. The third factor, like the first, will
depend upon how transformative the use of the original games was
and whether the new work acts as a market substitute. The more
content that is used, the more transformative the use needs to be.
With the fourth factor favoring, at least somewhat, the Let’s Play
gamer, a court’s analysis will come down to how much of the
original games were used and to what extent the gamer’s added
content transformed the original games.
Based upon this analysis, gamers would have a decent
argument of fair use. However, as discussed above, the costs of
fighting a DMCA takedown notice by a game publisher are
significant. Most Let’s Play gamers do not have the wherewithal to
take such a fight to court, while most game companies do. As a
result, gamers would have to connect with a group like the
Electronic Freedom Foundation which took the case for the plaintiff
in Lenz. Without such rare help, gamers are unlikely to be able to
even bring a case arguing fair use before a court, while game
companies have the resources to initiate such suits.
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Mystery Science Theater 3000 (“MST3K”) showed full films, usually B or C
list films, while a group of characters sat in the foreground of a darkened theater
lampooning the films throughout the showing. Generally, MST3K purchased the
rights to these films or used films in the public domain. See Home: Mystery
Science Theater 3000, MST3K.COM, https://www.mst3k.com/.
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO REPUTATIONAL HARMS

The underlying problem with the Pewdiepie situation is one
of harms not lining up with those cognizable under copyright law.
As the Supreme Court stated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the only
harms for which copyright law is the appropriate relief are those
concerned with market substitution.109 The increasing use of
copyright in order to protect against reputational harms, or even to
outright punish, as with Campo Santo’s takedown of Pewdiepie’s
video, does not match this market harm. A new approach is needed
to fill this gap.
The first approach may be for state legislatures to step in and
create new torts to cover the most egregious reputational harms,
such as those found with revenge porn. That particular species of
reputational harm fits poorly with copyright except where the first
sale doctrine applies.110 Where a single individual takes a nude or
otherwise explicit selfie, or creates a video of that same act, sends
the selfie or video to a significant other or simply keeps it on a
personal drive, that individual may rely upon the first sale doctrine
and copyright law to prevent publication. However, they could run
afoul of some courts such as the one in the Hulk Hogan case. That
court would not recognize their cause of action because the harms
do not align with those cognizable under copyright law. Further,
these individuals should take care as the use of the DMCA takedown
provisions to successfully remove revenge porn videos and images
is more likely due to the posters’ lack of understanding of the law
and resources to fight a takedown than it is to the legality of the
actions.
Additionally, revenge porn could also be moved to servers
located in countries where courts of the United States could not
reach. The result would be servers and owners of such servers who
could ignore DMCA takedowns at will.111 The stronger and more
effective solution would be enhancements to and adoption of
revenge porn laws such as those enacted in 46 states so far.112 These
laws criminalize the distribution of revenge porn but need to add
109

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-93.
This paper does not discuss the first sale doctrine which allows a copyright
holder to prevent publication or use of a copyrighted work where it has not been
sold at all or only sold to an extremely limited group. Video games subject to
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under the DMCA and copyright law).
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some method by which such images or videos may be removed
outside of the criminal process.
Unlike revenge porn, however, the problem of Let’s Play
videos and reputational harms lies in a different arena. Here, the
reputational harms game companies seek to mitigate are those of
association of their products with someone who maintains public
views outside of the mainstream or at least outside of that company’s
views. Pewdiepie has repeatedly used racial slurs and made antiSemitic comments or videos. But if copyright law can be bent to
permit actions against a person with an objectionable attitude who
may publicly purchase and review your product, then copyright
could be used to also marginalize someone using political speech in
a similar manner. The courts severely scrutinize other laws that
abridge the right of free speech, and Campo Santo’s use of the
DMCA to silence Pewdiepie drags the DMCA closer to a new
confrontation between the First Amendment and copyright law.
A better approach for Let’s Play videos would be stronger
and more specific licensing agreements. Currently, as discussed
above, game publishers approach licensing Let’s Play videos in a
haphazard manner. Some publishers, such as Campo Santo and
Blizzard, have specific terms licensing the use of their games in
Let’s Play videos.113 Unlike Campo Santo, however, Blizzard’s
“video policy” page lays out several guidelines including a morals
clause stating, “[t]o maintain and protect the image of our games,
Blizzard also requires that Productions maintain the “T” rating that
has been given to its products by the ESRB…”114 By limiting
content of Let’s Play videos to a “T” rating by the ESRB, Blizzard
can better police the use of its content and revoke licenses from Let’s
Play producers when they cross the line. This approach, with a
definite benchmark such as that provided by the ESRB or similar
rating, better defines the reputational harms a publisher is willing to
risk to the Let’s Play gamers.
Ultimately, greater education and stronger enforcement on
the put-back provision is necessary overall to protect speech. Lenz
was a good first step in this direction, but more needs to be done so
that the individuals who post videos on sites like YouTube are not
113

Blizzard devotes an entire webpage to their licensing terms for Let’s Play
videos. See Blizzard Video Policy, BLIZZARD, https://www.blizzard.com/enus/legal/dd76b654-f2c4-4aaa-ba49-ca3122de2376/blizzard-video-policy
[https://perma.cc/8QGD-FJWE].
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stifled by the legions of lawyers noted in the Urban survey. Uniform
licensing agreements that spell out the boundaries of Let’s Play
videos would provide stronger protection for both game publisher
and Let’s Play gamer against infringements of speech utilizing
copyright laws. Finally, a strict and consistent interpretation by the
courts of where copyright falls, and what remedies fit, is needed.
Such decisions by the courts would set the boundaries so that
legislatures would know where they need to legislate on issues and
where game publishers should license and would not stifle free
speech as a byproduct of protecting against harms that imperfectly
fit within this regime.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Because video games are licensed, not sold, to gamers for
their use, gamers that use these games in Let’s Play videos or
streams may end up violating or having those licenses revoked by
the rights holder. Gamers are then left in the realm of copyright
infringement. Game companies that then file DMCA takedowns or
sue Let’s Play gamers under copyright law should then do so only
when the harms align with the purpose of copyright law; to create
an exclusive market for the original work and any derivatives.
The Supreme Court has held that copyright law includes
First Amendment protections. These protections include the fair use
statute. However, the Court only addressed these issues in response
to expansions of the coverage of copyright law, and not specifically
with the extrajudicial power of the notice and takedown regime of
the DMCA. The use of the DMCA to censor gamers that hold
distasteful personal views, while socially commendable, abuses the
law and exposes a vulnerability in the DMCA.
The better solutions for reputational harms are those that
address the underlying issues; namely the use of the internet to
spread harmful materials like revenge porn. State legislatures are
already acting to limit this harm, and copyright law needs the
legislatures to take further action so that copyright is not used as a
solution where non-market harms are sought to be remedied.
Similarly, Let’s Play videos should be circumscribed by
explicit licensing agreements that delineate the behaviors permitted
by the game publishers and any copyright claims then examined
wholly under the fair use statute. This fair use analysis is required
by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lenz prior to any DMCA
takedown action. However, the rights holder only needs to show a
subjective good faith belief that there is no fair use. Because the
four-factor fair use analysis is largely fact based, depending upon
the facts of each use, a court would be hard pressed to find a lack of
subjective good faith belief against fair use should a rights holder
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issue a DMCA takedown. This leaves the door open for further
abuse of the DMCA by rights holders.
The fair use analysis will ultimately come down to how
transformative the use of the copyrighted works is, as the market
substitute touchstone for most of the factors will tend to favor a
finding of fair use. Unlike Google, gamers do not have the
significant legal resources and massive utility of their programs to
back up a legal case, making it difficult for gamers to defend a
DMCA fair use case.
The solution to this problem is two-fold. First, gamers and
service providers such as YouTube should become better educated
on fair use and specifically the DMCA put-back notice. More
complete and helpful notices from the service providers who receive
DMCA takedowns would aid in this. With a better understanding of
how the put-back system works, and the good faith beliefs required
for any notices, gamers would have a better chance of resisting such
takedowns. Second, a strict interpretation by the courts requiring a
market harm before the use of the DMCA would be permitted will
help set clearer boundaries on copyright law and make it easier for
gamers to understand what types of uses of copyrighted materials
are permitted.

